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FORMED BY THALIDOMIDE: MASS TORTS AS A FALSE
CURE FOR TOXIC EXPOSURE
Anita Bernstein*
Professor Bernstein considers a theme ofJudge Weinstein's judicial and
academic writings--that tort law works imperfectly to effect justice in mass
disaster cases-through the vehicle of thalidomide, the paradigmatic toxic
substance. Thirty-five years ago, thalidomide poisoned thousands of chil-
dren, inflicting limb-reduction birth defects. Professor Bernstein argues that
the drug has also had a malforming effect on mass tort law. Courts and
scholars have used the precedent of thalidomide to build stringent legal stan-
dards of proof and causation, without enough attention to the functions and
consistency of these standards. Thalidomide has also prompted commenta-
tors to celebrate American drug regulation and the American liability system;
Professor Bernstein argues that these paeans are exaggerated. She concludes
that the United States must confront its thalidomide history, as other nations
in the world have done, and build social institutions-strong regulation
and social insurance-to guard against toxic disasters of the future.
INTRODUCTION
Although an invitation to write about "one of Judge Weinstein's in-
terests" resembles an invitation to write about Life, anyone considering
the innumerable possible topics will eventually reflect on the problem of
causation in mass-exposure litigation, a subject illuminated in the writings
of our honoree,' his fellow judges, 2 and scholars represented in this
Tribute.3 This Essay addresses the venerable and familiar subject of cau-
* Professor of Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of
Law; Law Clerk, ChiefJudgeJack B. Weinstein, 1985-1986. The influence of Paul Fanning
pervades this Essay, although Paul is blameless with respect to its shortcomings. Carolyn
Raffensperger and Joel Tickner provided a wealth of ideas, particularly on the
precautionary principle and other themes related to environmentalism. Jamie Schwartz
delivered her research assistance sooner and more thoroughly than she promised. My
colleagues at Chicago-Kent, especially Katharine Baker, Jacob Corr6, and Hank Perritt,
gave me the thoughtful comments on which I have come to depend. The Marshall Ewell
Fund provided financial support. I salute Judge Weinstein on this celebration of his long,
wise, and influential tenure on the federal bench.
1. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), afl'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987);Jack B. Weinstein, IndividualJustice in Mass Tort
Litigation 151-52 (1994) [hereinafter Weinstein, Individual Justice]; Jack B. Weinstein,
The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 Geo. L.J. 1389-90 (1985).
2. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1993)
(Blackmun, J.) (reviewing disputed causation evidence), on remand, 43 F.3d 1311,
1313-14 (9th Cir. 1995) (Kozinski, J.) (analyzing statistical proof of causation); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1987) (Winter, J.) ("Proving
that the ailments of a particular individual were caused by Agent Orange is also extremely
difficult.").
3. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2117 passim (1997); John C.P.
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sation through an unusual idiom. My vehicle is thalidomide, a drug that
from 1957 to 1961 caused gruesome birth defects around the world, and
would have wreaked disaster in the United States if the FDA had not re-
fused to approve it.4 Though still manufactured and studied today,5
thalidomide lives on mostly in memory.
Exploring the memory of thalidomide, this Essay considers causation
at different levels. Although some writers like to associate the substance
with perfect certainty and perfect evil, thalidomide has become a source
of ambiguity that now affects both litigated cases and public debate over
environmentally induced illness. In particular, thalidomide is an impor-
tant and underestimated causal antecedent in American liability law; "the
aftermath" of thalidomide 6 included substantive and procedural changes
in mass tort law.7 My discussion of causation focuses on one of these
changes, arguing that thalidomide has established an unrealistic standard
of proof for claimants, both in the courts' and in public debate about
toxic exposure. Complacency accompanies this unrealistic ideal of causa-
tion: Americans have chosen to learn dubious lessons from their experi-
ence with thalidomide, using this memory to bolster their faith in mass
Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, andJust Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 2034, 2039-42, 2053, 2058 (1997).
4. See S. Rep. No. 87-1744 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.CA.N. 2884, 2905-08
(summarizing thalidomide history). Famous among these defects is "phocomelia," a Greek
term meaning "seal limbs." Id., reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.Ca.N. 2884, 2905.
5. See Tina Adler, The Return of Thalidomide, 146 Sci. News 424 (1994) (noting that
thalidomide has been used for decades outside the United States to treat leprosy); Tinker
Ready, Sullied Drug Endorsed: Thalidomide Found to Ease AIDS Sores, The News &
Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), May 22, 1997, at Al (describing research on thalidomide as a
treatment for ulcers, macular degeneration, leprosy, and AIDS-related diseases).
Thalidomide recently received conditional FDA approval for the treatment of leprosy. See
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 37 Years Later, a Second Chance for Thalidomide, N.Y. Times, Sept.
23, 1997, at Al.
6. Writers favor this locution, referring also to "the wake" of thalidomide. See Note,
FDA Reform and the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 2009, 2012
(1995) [hereinafter Note, FDA Reform]; Curtis A. Kin, Note, Coming Soon to the "Genetic
Supermarket" Near You, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1573, 1581 n.44 (1996); Claire A. Milner,
Comment, Gulf War Guinea Pigs: Is Informed Consent Optional During War?, 13 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 199, 212 n.85 (1996); John Schwartz, Conservative Foes of
Government Regulation Focus on the FDA, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1995, at A7; The Secret of
Eternal Life, Economist, May 24, 1997, at 60, 60.
7. Consistent with prevailing practice, I use "toxic torts," "mass torts," "mass exposure
liability," "toxics liability," and similar terms more or less interchangeably. By "mass torts" I
mean to exclude single-event, clear-cause disasters such as airplane crashes and the Bhopal
explosion. This Essay focuses on claims of physical injury or disease resulting from
"substances [encountered] by inhalation, ingestion, [or] dermal exposure," Gerald W.
Boston & M. Stuart Madden, Law of Environmental and Toxic Torts: Cases, Materials and
Problems 1 (1994), or other physical contact, where the substance reached numerous
persons at about the same time. Common themes running through these cases include
long latency periods, problems of proving causation, indeterminacies regarding the source
of exposure, and the need for expert scientific testimony. See id. at 6-9.
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torts as a cure for toxic exposure. A fairer reading of the thalidomide
record supports a contrary inference.
This Essay follows a form related to its content. Part I offers an un-
disputed history of thalidomide-as-causal-agent. Social change and legal
changes occurring soon after the thalidomide disaster are thought to be
closely related to that experience. Some types of legal change-for ex-
ample, settlements between thalidomide victims and national govern-
ments outside the United States 8-are unquestionably tied to
thalidomide; other changes, such as the creation of a European suprana-
tional drug regulatory agency, appear to be children of thalidomide as
well.9 Part II, "Americans Celebrate Thalidomide," and Part III, "Current
Lessons from an Old Catastrophe," move freely into an exploration of
thalidomide as a signifier, considering this drug as a specter and a meta-
phor. My contention is that because thalidomide certainly caused some
effects (i.e., birth defects), probably caused other effects, and might well
have had something to do with even more effects, it is likely that
thalidomide indicates a need for variation and flexibility on questions of
toxic-tort causation; thalidomide does not mark a pole of causal
confidence.
Causation in this flexible, variegated sense has entered public de-
bate. Commentators have pointed out the divergence between two stan-
dards of proof, the legal and the scientific.10 But the thalidomide experi-
ence teaches that more than two standards are needed. Social and legal
effects following thalidomide, some linked closely to the drug and some
more distantly related, support an extension of causation beyond its fo-
rensic meaning." Different evidence about the causation of harm justi-
fies different responses.
Here thalidomide retains current vitality. In response to claims
about new syndromes-Gulf War illness, silicone-related autoimmune dis-
ease, harms ascribed to "offgassing" and "sick buildings," and others-
some recent commentary has opposed the kind of flexibility about the
standard of proof of causation that I advocate here.' 2 This fashionable
8. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
10. See SheilaJasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America
119-23 (1995) (examining the ways causation can be proved in court); Peter H. Schuck,
Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 14-29
(1993).
11. A determination of liability requires stronger proof of causation than a regulation,
for instance, and a regulation requires stronger proof than a decision to investigate
further. One standard of causation cannot fit a variety of policy options; many standards
are needed. See infra Part II.B. Along similar lines, I mean to suggest that causation can
be shown in ways other than a description of mechanistic displacement of particles. See
infra note 87 and accompanying text. Cultural influences, for example, lead to new
effects, and thus are "causal," but cannot be shown to exist by Newtonian mechanistic
evidence.
12. See infra note 116 and accompanying text
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posture obstructs good policymaking about toxic risks. The thalidomide
experience indicates that new claims about risks will proliferate, and that
they demand varying levels of respect. Never so stark and simple a poison
as some observers like to think, thalidomide invites policymakers to use a
variety of standards of proof when they assess claims of risk.
Above all, I conclude, thalidomide teaches that toxic risks call for
stringent regulation and an expansion of social insurance. A legalistic
approach to toxic exposure, with its strict and monolithic standards of
proof, allows too much danger to flourish and neglects the calamities that
invariably come after the creation of risk. Other wealthy nations, forced
to confront their thalidomide heritage more directly than the United
States, have drawn this inference. A causal antecedent whose influence is
now (thankfully) discursive rather than physical, thalidomide may yet be-
come a source for better law and policy.
I. THE SociAL AND LEGAL AFrER ATH OF THALIDOMIDE
A. Thalidomide as a New Signifier
Thalidomide spurred immeasurable political change, extending be-
yond law and regulation into the cultures of the world.13 In medicine
and public health, teratology--the study of birth defects-bloomed from
neglect and obscurity after thalidomide. A journal by that title began
publishing in 1965; 14 Neurotoxicology and Teratology followed later.
Thalidomide prompted the adoption of developmental disability surveil-
lance systems in the United States and around the world.15 Eight hun-
dred studies by teratologists sought to understand how the substance
caused phocomelia. 16 Physicians became concerned with the ability of
toxins to cross the placenta, and slowly became more cautious about pre-
scribing drugs for pregnant patients.' 7 Public perceptions about the
causes of harm to newborn infants shifted: before thalidomide, nature
was blamed; after thalidomide, "human causes" emerged as a presump-
tive culprit.' 8
13. See Michael D. Green, Bendectin and Birth Defects: The Challenges of Mass
Toxic Substances Litigation 82 (1996) (calling thalidomide the paradigmatic "dramatic
event"); see also id. at 63 (noting that thalidomide "received more public attention than
any other drug in history").
14. SeeJames G. Wilson, Current Status of Teratology, in Handbook of Teratology 47,
48 (James Wilson & F. Clarke Fraser eds., 1977) (listing the considerable literature on the
subject).
15. See Godfrey B. Oakley, Jr., Population and Case-Control Surveillance in the
Search for Environmental Causes of Birth Defects, Pub. Health Rep., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at
465, available in LEXIS, GENMED Library, PHR File.
16. See Mark Dowie, Teratology: The Loneliest Science, Am. Health, June 1990, at
59, 61-62.
17. See Green, supra note 13, at 82.
18. Jean Reith Schroedel & Paul Peretz, A Gender Analysis of Policy Formation: The
Case of Fetal Abuse, 19 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 335, 351 (1994).
2156 [Vol. 97:2153
FORMED BY THALIDOMIDE
At an overtly political level, the story of Sherri Finkbine expanded
support for abortion rights. A mother of several children who learned in
1961 that she was pregnant and knew that she had taken thalidomide at a
crucial time, Finkbine sought an abortion in her home state of Arizona, a
state that permitted abortion when sanctioned by a physician. A local
hospital agreed to the procedure but withdrew its permission when pub-
licity spread about Finkbine's reason, and Finkbine had to travel to
Sweden for the abortion. 19 Further publicity continued, linking
thalidomide with reproductive freedom in particular and individual
rights in general.20 Horrific thalidomide damage seemed to many Ameri-
cans a good justification to terminate pregnancy, and thus revealed the
inadequacy of the "therapeutic" or "health-of-the-mother" criterion for
abortion.21
Thalidomide quickly entered the lexicon as a metaphor for poison
and evil. "For years I have heard the word 'Wait!"' wrote Martin Luther
King, Jr. in his famous Letter from Birmingham City Jail. "It rings in the ear
of every Negro with a piercing familiarity. This 'wait' has almost always
meant 'Never.' It has been a tranquilizing thalidomide, relieving the
emotional stress for a moment, only to give birth to an ill-formed infant
of frustration."2 2 Conservative activists have compared day care to
thalidomide, 23 and in congressional testimony thalidomide was men-
tioned by one witness who sought to denounce child abuse protection as
"a new poison, posing as a cure."24 Scholars in a variety of disciplines
have explored thalidomide as a signifier-a chemical compound that has
taken on a multifaceted cultural identity.25
19. See Eva R. Rubin, Abortion, Politics, and the Courts: Roe v. Wade and Its
Aftermath 20-21 (1982).
20. See James C. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National
Policy, 1800-1900, at 252-53 (1978); Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes
37-38 (1990).
21. See Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 62-65 (1984).
22. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail 5 (1963).
23. See Kenneth Labich, Can Your Career HurtYour Kids?, Fortune, May 20, 1991, at
38, 44.
24. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of the House Comm. on Economic and Educational
Opportunities, 104th Cong. 39-49 (1995) (statement of Carol Lamb Hopkins,
schoolteacher and school administrator).
25. For a survey of thalidomide-and-culture as seen within a variety of disciplines, see
Konrad Bloch, Blondes in Venetian Paintings, The Nine-Banded Armadillo, and Other
Essays in Biochemistry 225-26 (1994) (discussing thalidomide and comparative
biochemistry); Roald Hoffinann, The Same and Not the Same 129-40 (1995) (exploring
carbon compounds that are "the same and not the same" as thalidomide); DavidJ. Skal,
The Monster Show. A Cultural History of Horror 289-92 (1993) (linking thalidomide to a
preoccupation of 1960s Hollywood films with the evils of sex and reproduction); (Rabbi)
Immanuel Jacobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, 22 Hum. Life Rev. 55, 57 (1996)
(analyzing debate in Jewish law over the question of abortion when a pregnant woman
knows she was exposed to thalidomide); Bob Lamm, Television's Forgotten Gems: "The
Nurses," 23 J. Popular Film & Television 72, 76 (1995) (discussing public effect of
19971 2157
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B. Legal Shifts Outside the United States
In the United States, where thalidomide reached few victims,2 6
national-level legal change emphasized regulatory protections but also
took form in modifications to common-law doctrine. Elsewhere, where
exposure was much greater, thalidomide had a more immediate impact
on toxin litigation and national legislation. 27 At the international level,
the European Union adopted a products liability reform statute28 whose
origins have been traced to the thalidomide experience in Western
Europe.29
Outside the United States, thalidomide exposure generated criminal
and civil litigation that frequently resulted in state and private compensa-
tion of victims. In September 1965, German prosecutors charged nine
industry executives with manslaughter and intent to commit bodily
harm. 30 The manufacturer, Chemie Grfinenthal, eventually agreed to es-
tablish a fund of DM 100 million to compensate the victims, 3 1 a fund to
which the West German government, recognizing its responsibility both
as a social welfare state and as a government that had been remiss in
writing and enforcing licensing laws, also agreed to contribute.3 2
Thalidomide victims in Japan brought class actions against two drug man-
ufacturers and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which concluded with
both the drug manufacturers and the state admitting liability.33 In
thalidomide drama episode aired in 1963); Valerie Grove, Small Body, Big Voice, Big
Heart, Times (London), Feb. 2, 1996, at 14 (studying work of classical musician Thomas
Quastihoff, a German singer disabled by thalidomide); Carl Mollins, Echoes of the Past,
Maclean's, Dec. 25, 1995, at 54, 70-71 (reviewing coverage of thalidomide as news story by
Canadian journalists); Roy Porter, The Rise and Fall of the Age of Miracles, Hist. Today,
Nov. 1996, at 69, 73-74 (summarizing, from a historical perspective, the view that
thalidomide augured a public perception of medicine as a cause rather than a cure of
disease).
26. Seventeen cases of thalidomide-induced birth defects have been well
documented, with another nine cases suspected of being caused by thalidomide. See
Green, supra note 13, at 74. Thalidomide was never approved and thus never marketed in
the United States, see id. at 66, but some Americans encountered the substance following
foreign distribution. See infra note 110.
27. Thalidomide was marketed in 48 nations. See Lauran Neergaard, FDA Eyes
Thalidomide Return; New Use May Lessen Pain of AIDS, Chattanuga Times, Nov. 13, 1996,
atA1. Many but not all of these nations later strengthened their drug regulation and some
established compensation plans for victims. See, e.g., Harvey Teff, Drug Approval in
England and the United States, 33 Am. J. Comp. L. 567, 567 (1985).
28. See Council Directive 85/374, 1985 OJ. (L 210) 29.
29. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
30. "[T]he trial promised to rival Nuremberg." Phillip Knightley et al., Insight Team
of The Sunday Times of London, Suffer the Children: The Story of Thalidomide 122
(1979).
31. See Patricia Howlett, Compensation for Drug Induced Fetal Deformities in
Common and Civil Law Systems, 2 Touro J. Transnat'l L. 243, 252-55 (1991).
32. See John G. Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 297,
314 (1982).
33. See Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H. Raddock, Japan's New Product Liability Law:
The Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, but Access to Recovery is Limited by Formidable
2158 [Vol. 97:2153
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Britain, a group of parents brought a lawsuit against Distillers, the British
licensee, and won a settlement of about £54,000 per child, topped off
with £5 million of government funds to offset the income tax due on the
settlement awards.34 A lawsuit against a Canadian distributor resulted in
a settlement of about $200,000 per child35 and the establishment of a
federal compensation fund of about $8.5 million.36
Legislatures were also active in addressing the thalidomide disaster.
Germany adopted the Pharmaceutical Law of 1976,37 which aimed at
forestalling and repairing a thalidomide-scale tragedy in the future,38
compensating drug-injured victims, and obliging pharmaceutical manu-
facturers to carry insurance.3 9 In Sweden, under "the gun of alternative
legislation by the Ministry of Justice,"40 pharmaceutical manufacturers
agreed to "voluntary" group insurance that would compensate drug-
injured claimants beyond the levels of Swedish social security.41 Legisla-
tive responses to thalidomide in Japan included the Drug Side-Effect
Barriers, 16 U. Pa.J. Int'l Bus. L. 669, 686 & n.91 (1995). Awards averaged $133,000 per
child, $13,000 per set of parents, and an additional $13,000 for legal fees per claimant. See
David Cohen & Karen Martin, Western Ideology, Japanese Product Safety Regulation and
International Trade, 19 U.B.C. L. Rev. 315, 341 n.122 (1985). The famous litigatibn, a
landmark of Japanese civil law, has been discussed widely in the law reviews as a specific
instance of claims-consciousness in a society that generally condemns recourse to the
courts. See Frank K. Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan 206-08 (1987);
Akio Morishima & Malcolm Smith, Accident Compensation Schemes in Japan: A Window
on the Operation of Law in a Society, 20 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 491, 492 (1986).
34. See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 146, 204-05.
35. See Elaine Carey, Thalidomide 'Babies' at 25: Struggling to Live on a Pittance,
Toronto Star, Sept. 27, 1987, at Al. The figure is in Canadian dollars.
36. See Thalidomide Victims Fight for Compensation: Government Demands
'Unreasonable,' They Say, Edmonton J., Sept. 1, 1991, at A7. The figure is in Canadian
dollars.
37. Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Arzneimittelrechts, v. 24.8.1976 (BGB1. I S.2445).
38. See Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. & Rainer G. Czeniek, A Study of the Drug Laws of the
Federal Republic of Germany, 32 Food Drug Cosm. LJ. 488, 489 & n.4 (1977); John M.
Geddes, West German Drug Industry Besieged, Wall St. J., May 31, 1984, at 35.
39. In order to be compensated, a drug claimant must be injured by a drug that is
defective (defect being defined with reference to "damaging effects which exceed the
bounds considered justifiable"), with strict liability, rather than fault or warranty, as the
basis of responsibility. See Howiett, supra note 31, at 267-68.
40. Fleming, supra note 32, at 301.
41. Unlike the German scheme, the Swedish system does not require that the drug be
defective and covers a variety of other injuries. See Carl Oldertz, Security Insurance,
Patient Insurance, and Pharmaceutical Insurance in Sweden, 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 635, 640
(1986). The statute is Produktansar I, Ersattning for Rakemedelsukada (Compensation for
Damage Caused to Persons and Property by Industrial Products), SOU 1976: 23,
Stockholm, Ministry of Justice. See also Ferdinando Albanese & Louis F. Del Duca,
Developments in European Product Liability, 5 Dick. J. Int'l L. 193, 203-04 (1987)
(suggesting that a drug need not be defective, but that only injuries caused by medicines
are covered).
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Injury Relief Fund Act, passed by the Diet in 1979,42 and the
Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, administered by the Ministry of Health and
Welfare. 43 Under this legislation new drugs must be approved prior to
introduction into the market, and must be overseen after introduction
into the market, with attention to toxicity and efficacy.44 Drug regulation
in Canada, relatively elaborate before the thalidomide disaster,45 was in-
creased along the lines of the United States model.46
In addition to spurring changes in the domestic law of many coun-
tries, the thalidomide experience contributed to a variety of legal changes
at the international and supranational level. The European products lia-
bility statute of 1985, popularly called "the Directive," imposed compre-
hensive products liability reform on the European Union, generally in
the direction of stricter liability than what had prevailed at the national
level. 47 Thalidomide shaped the 1985 Directive in several ways, bringing
to the fore a concern with nonprivy bystanders, unforeseeable risks, and
personal injury (rather than economic loss, even though the jurisdic-
tional basis of the European Union is commercial).48 Scholars link both
the Directive and its predecessors-including the 1977 Strasbourg
Convention on Product Liability4 9 and the 1978 Pearson Royal
Commission recommendations 5 0-with a public sentiment for reform de-
rived from the devastation of thalidomide in Europe.5 '
Perhaps influenced by the observation that Grinenthal had mar-
keted thalidomide worldwide, the European Union promulgated numer-
42. See Fleming, supra note 32, at 303; see also id. at 303-04 (describing this fund as a
device unlike the German model of strict liability and the Swedish group-insurance
approach: it was rather "a special compensation fund with social security overtones").
43. See Rosemarie Kanusky, Comment, Pharmaceutical Harmonization:
Standardizing Regulations Among the United States, the European Economic Community,
and Japan, 16 Hous.J. Int'l L. 665, 683 (1994).
44. See id. at 685-87; see also Robert B. Leflar, Informed Consent and Patients'
Rights in Japan, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 75-76 (1996) (explaining Japan's motivation for
.protection of human subjects" as caused by stricter western mandates for drug approval in
their markets).
45. See Willem Wassenaar, Drug Regulation in Canada, 2 Legal Med. Q. 209 (1978).
46. See Joel Lexchin, We Need a War on Legal Drugs: Useless and Unsafe Products
Still Being Sold, Toronto Star, June 13, 1994, at A15.
47. See 1985 OJ. (L 210) 29. The Directive announces its progressive purpose by
referring to "liability without fault on the part of the producer," id. at Preamble, a term
that moved ahead of fault and contract-based liability traditions. See Kathleen M. Nilles,
Note, Defining the Limits of Liability: A Legal and Political Analysis of the European
Community Products Liability Directive, 25 Va. J. Int'l L. 729, 735-36 (1985).
48. See Jane Stapleton, Product Liability 5, 42-43, 45 (1994).
49. European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and
Death, Jan. 27, 1977, 1977 Europa T.S. No. 91.
50. Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury,
Report, 1978, Cmmd. 7054-I.
51. See Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 41, at 193-94; Jane Stapleton, Products
Liability Reform-Real or Illusory?, 6 OxfordJ. Legal Stud. 392, 392 (1986); Nilles, supra
note 47, at 737-39.
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ous directives pertaining to the regulation of pharmaceuticals and related
products such as medical devices.52 These regulatory efforts receive addi-
tional support by frequent communication between the European Union
and regulatory agencies in the United States andJapan as well as interna-
tional agencies, including the World Health Organization and the
Council of Europe.53 The European Agency for the Evaluation of
Medicinal Products, often described as the European counterpart to the
FDA, now approves new drugs for marketing in the European Union, and
monitors drug safety in the common market.54 Historical links between
this international regulatory scheme and thalidomide may be inferred. 55
H. AMERIcANs CELEBRATE THALIDOMIDE
A. Unwarranted Confidence
1. Agency Regulation. - According to conventional wisdom,
thalidomide had a strong effect on U.S. regulatory laws: the 1962 amend-
ments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)5 6 are said
to have originated in the thalidomide disaster.5 7 While the thalidomide
experience has been given credit for building strong American drug reg-
ulations, strong American drug regulations have been given credit for the
nation's unique experience with thalidomide.58 The claim both that
strong drug regulations caused the (fortunate) thalidomide experience
and that the thalidomide experience caused strong drug regulations,
though not entirely silly, betrays an eagerness to proclaim the power of
52. See Kanusky, supra note 43, at 676-83.
53. See Fernand Sauer, Harmonization of Biotechnological Regulations in the
European Community, in Drug Biotechnology Regulation: Scientific Basis and Practices
455, 459 (Yuan-yuan H. Chiu & John L. Gueriguian eds., 1991).
54. See Eric M. Katz, Europe's Centralized New Drug Procedures: Is the United
States Prepared to Keep Pace?, 48 Food & Drug LJ. 577, 577-78 (1993).
55. See W.J. Currie, The Evolving Horizon of Drug Registration-Europe and
Beyond, 39 Eur. J. Clinical Pharmocology 453, 453 (1990) (connecting European Agency
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products with post-thalidomide national drug regulation);
Kanusky, supra note 43, at 687-89 (surveying the history of "pharmaceutical
harmonization" and finding early developments to have begun around 1970, when
thalidomide-derived reforms had gotten underway).
56. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
57. See Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A
Contractarian Model of Access, 11 Yale J. on Reg. 401, 408 (1994); Lewis A. Scheindiin,
Note, New Drug Approval: Lannett, the Drug Lag, and the NDA System, 11 Rut-Cam. LJ.
231, 233 (1980); Judith Havemann, Experimental Drugs, Power and the Limits of
Deregulation, Wash. Post, July 15, 1987, at A21; PhilipJ. Hilts, U.S. Cracks Down on Health
Devices Made Before 1976, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1992, at Al; Cody Holt, The Evolution of
the OTC Drug Industry, Am. Druggist, Apr. 1996, at 51, 60.
58. See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 245; Richard E. McFadyen, Thalidomide in
America: A Brush with Tragedy, 11 Clio Medica 79, 80 (1976); Max Sherman & Steven
Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 Food Drug Cosm. LJ. 458, 458
(1986).
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American regulation, facts or no facts.5 9 Yet the relationship between
thalidomide and drug regulation is far from direct. First, thalidomide
certainly did not awaken President Kennedy and the United States
Congress to the need for more rules; FEDCA amendments were well un-
derway before the thalidomide story reached the United States, although
the catastrophe undoubtedly helped Senator Kefauver and others inter-
ested in drug reform. 60 Second, it is not regulation as such but rather
one regulator's intelligence and tenacity that stopped thalidomide from
being marketed in the United States.61 Third, the 1962 FFDCA amend-
ments focus on efficacy, not safety, and would thus be of little direct ef-
fect in preventing a future thalidomide-like disaster.62
Despite these gaps between one phenomenon and another, the con-
ventional wisdom linking thalidomide with regulation has proved expedi-
ent. Commentators who favor the expedited approval of new drug appli-
cations have complained that while patients die the FDA cannot move
because it fears approving "the next thalidomide."6 3 The FDA looks alert
and vigilant if a bit gloomy. Industry looks well-monitored.
Yet if drug regulation was strengthened in Europe because of the
disaster of thalidomide, as the record indicates, then it is plausible to
surmise that drug regulation was not strengthened in the United States
because of the triumph of thalidomide. Postapproval regulation, for ex-
ample, has been and remains feeble. 64 The sensible proposal that the
FDA handle clinical investigations of new drugs, with studies paid for by
59. SeeJulie De Falco, The FDA and Its All-Purpose Response to Critics, Wash. Times,
March 30, 1995, at A25, available in LEXIS, New Library, PAPERS File.
60. See Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs & the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for
Reform, 17 Ain.J.L. & Med. 363, 377 (1991); David Woodward, The New Drug Marketing:
A Consumer Protection Perspective, 51 Food & Drug LJ. 637, 646-47 (1996).
61. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
62. See Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 781 (1962). The 1962 amendments made two
basic changes in drug regulation: they required explicit FDA approval of new drugs,
whereas before 1962 agency silence for a certain time after an application entitled an
applicant to market the drug, and they required the FDA to investigate efficacy as well as
safety. See Note, FDA Reform, supra note 6, at 2012. On the inability of the efficacy
amendments to stop a thalidomide disaster, see Joseph G. Contrera, The Food and Drug
Administration and the International Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious
Will International Pharmaceutical Regulations Become?, 8 Admin. Lj. Am. U. 927, 935-36
& n.35 (1995);Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle
of Mass Torts, 43 Hastings LJ. 301, 314 n.57 (1992) (noting that teratogenic effects of
thalidomide were not replicable in several species of animals, including rats, mice, and
hamsters). Efficacy-related approval delays could, of course, have the incidental effect of
allowing time for safety-related information to accrete.
63. See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Trade-Offs 273 (1992); accord C. Frederick Beckner III,
The FDA's War on Drugs, 82 Geo. LJ. 529, 543 (1993). The complaint has achieved some
success in hastening the approval process. See Salbu, supra note 57, at 410 (emphasizing
how AIDS has increased the demand for expediting the approval process).
64. See Knightley et a, supra note 30, at 246-50.
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the pharmaceutical-company sponsors, has languished for twenty years. 65
Few new ideas related to drug regulation, other than exhortation either
to speed up approvals or slow them down, have been tried or even heard.
By fixing attention on a regulatory "victory," thalidomide has built com-
placency about American drug regulation.
2. The Isolation of Individuals. - In addition to instilling a sense of
unwarranted triumph about American regulatory law, the thalidomide
experience in the United States helped to ground the development of
mass exposure law in notions of individualism. Thalidomide emphasized
the lone hero-regulator rather than the regulatory system, deepened a
boundary line separating the United States from other industrialized
countries, disconnected injured persons from one another with proce-
dural barriers, and helped to build a destructive myth of the deserving
plaintiff.
The American individual who gained the most fame from
thalidomide, Frances Kelsey,66 contributed unintentionally to a percep-
tion of toxic exposure as a threat to be countered with a strong personal-
ity. Emerging in sharp relief from her gray bureau, the Kelsey persona
celebrates many illusory triumphs: the acumen of one mind, even
though Kelsey partially misperceived the danger of thalidomide;67 the
ability of individual drug-industry regulators to resist external pressure, a
notion belied most recently by the successes of an AIDS activists/industry
coalition in changing FDA criteria for new-drug approval; 68 and the vic-
tory of a junior official over an industry Goliath, an improbable episode
that has not recurred. Unquestionably heroic, and perhaps deserving of
even more credit for her efforts against thalidomide, Frances Kelsey
nonetheless cannot, by herself, stop or cure toxic exposure.
Just as Kelsey-the-individual grew to proportions beyond American
regulation, an emphasis on individuals came to overwhelm the collective
nature of American mass tort law. By now the claim that American law is
"individualistic" has become a truism in need of no additional elabora-
65. The proposal is tentatively endorsed in Green, supra note 13, at 335. Suggestions
along these lines are described in Sidney A. Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation from New
Drug Research: A Consideration of Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data,
1978 Duke LJ. 155, 177-81.
66. Frances Oldham Kelsey, who had both an M.D. and a Ph.D. in pharmacology, was
the FDA official assigned to review the application for thalidomide; this application was the
first she reviewed. Her refusal to approve the drug enraged the American manufacturer,
Merrell (later known as Richardson-Merrell and Merrell Dow). The company pressured
Kelsey relentlessly, even accusing her of libel. When news from Europe came in to support
herjudgment, Kelsey worked to stop the U.S. clinical trials, while a reluctant Merrell barely
cooperated. In August 1962 Kelsey was awarded the President's Award for Distinguished
Federal Civilian Service. See Cindy Pearson, Doctor Who Stopped Thalidomide Celebrates
80th Birthday, Nat'l Women's Health Network News, Sept. 1994, at 1.
67. Kelsey had worried about adult nerve damage rather than thalidomide's much
more dangerous threat, phocomelia. See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 78-79.
68. See Salbu, supra note 57, at 410-18.
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tion.69 Mass tort law, following thalidomide, was distorted by this predi-
lection for individualism: the sine qua non of mass torts is aggregation,70
but the thalidomide experience emphasized opposite circumstances.
Courts picked up the theme of isolation when plaintiffs brought
thalidomide-related lawsuits in the United States. Although thalidomide
crossed national borders, American courts interpreted the law of per-
sonal jurisdiction to refuse some claims of thalidomide-injured persons
born in the United States,7 ' as well as claims of foreigners who were in-
jured by thalidomide manufactured in the United States, but purchased
abroad.7 2 One commentator identifies thalidomide litigation on the
question of jurisdiction as a source of isolation, entrenching national
boundaries as false lines in a global reality.
7 3
Finally, thalidomide introduced to the United States a concern about
individual mass-tort plaintiffs, focusing attention on individual victims at
the expense of a thoughtful evaluation of toxic effects. Babies and chil-
dren injured by thalidomide set a standard of innocence to which few
subsequent toxic-substance victims could compare. 74 Elsewhere I have
argued that American private law relies on dichotomous contrasts to sup-
port its rejections of plaintiffs' demands; such plaintiffs are deemed to fall
short of an ideal that, if met, would have justified a favorable outcome in
69. See George Anastaplo, The American Moralist: On Law, Ethics, and Government
32 (1992) (criticizing the Moral Majority for its emphasis on the individual rather than
community); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 241 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969)
("however annoying a law may be, the American will submit to it... ; he regards it as a
contract to which he is one of the parties"); Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70
Notre Dame L. Rev. 727, 750 (1995) (agreeing with rights critics that "American legal
discourse is fixated with individual rights").
70. Judge Weinstein has explored this paradox in numerous writings. See Weinstein,
Individual Justice, supra note 1, at 1-4, 39; Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass
Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 469, 521-23 (1994).
71. See Harvey v. Chemie Granentha, 354 F.2d 428, 429-31 (2d Cir. 1965) (barring
claim of American twins whose mother had brought thalidomide from Germany).
72. See Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 38-39 (3d Cir. 1975)
(maintaining that Quebecois plaintiffs were bound by unfavorable Canadian law).
73. "[C]ourts failed to exercise the full scope of in personam jurisdiction available to
them thereby insulating foreign manufacturers from suit in the United States." StephenJ.
Werber, The Constitutional Dimension of a National Products Liability Statute of Repose,
40 Vill. L. Rev. 985, 1046 (1995) (citation omitted).
74. A book chapter title, "Alone in a World of Horror," conveys some of the isolation
of thalidomide claimants. See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 112-21. The innocence of
victims did not spare thalidomide parents, who frequently blamed themselves for their
children's disabilities, see id. at 115-16; mothers were accused of having "dosed themselves
indiscriminately" during pregnancy because they were "neurotic," id. at 117. A
psychologist who studied Canadian parents noted that professionals had faulted their
various coping mechanisms, based on contradictory criteria. See Ethel Roskies,
Abnormality and Normality- The Mothering of Thalidomide Children 14-21 (1972).
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court.75 Caselaw and scholarship reveal this tendency.7 6 Robert Rabin,
for example, has explored how cigarette manufacturers slurred plaintiffs'
characters during litigation.77 Judges have faulted asbestos plaintiffs for
smoking, with little effort to measure the increment of extra harm that
smoking could have caused.78 Female victims in mass exposure cases
have historically been easy to impugn.79 Post-thalidomide toxics litiga-
tion, in sum, frequently appears to blame plaintiffs for being adult
individuals.80
B. An Unattainable Ideal of Causation
Although its mechanism of destruction is still not well understood,
thalidomide easily met scientific and legal criteria necessary to prove cau-
sation in fact. Limb reduction birth defects (one among many harms
thalidomide caused) appeared in about half the children born to
mothers who took thalidomide during "the fifteen-day period when or-
gans are formed; the background rate of this birth defect is less than one
75. See Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1227,
1306-07 (1994).
76. See generally Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and
Corporate Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence Through Stricter Process, 38 Vill. L. Rev.
1361, 1409 n.248 (1993) (summarizing victim-blaming in various mass exposure cases).
77. See Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort
Liability, in Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and Culture 110, 124 (Robert L. Rabin &
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).
78. See Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1985) (refusing
recovery for increased risk of cancer); Special Project: An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and
Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 573, 631-33 (1983)
(citations omitted) (noting that courts have reduced damages in cases where the plaintiff
smokes).
79. See Morton Mintz, At Any Cost: Corporate Greed, Women, and the Dalkon
Shield 194-209 (1985) (noting deliberate effort of defendant to humiliate plaintiffs during
discovery); Anne E. Simon, Whose Move? Breaking the Stalemate in Feminist and
Environmental Activism, 2 UCLA Women's L.J. 145, 153 (1992) (stating that courts tend to
blame women and children for harms caused by ingesting lead paint). One feminist
scholar suggests that the very concept of "mass tort" has been "created, defined, and legally
recognized" in a way that excludes or slights the interests of female claimants. Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road,
80 Cornell L. Rev. 1159, 1175 n.58 (1995).
80. It is difficult to explain otherwise how asbestos and tobacco defendants could
argue simultaneously, and with some success, that their products do not cause illness and
that the product's dangers were obvious to the plaintiffs, or that the plaintiffs were
contributorily negligent for not heeding information about these dangers. See, e.g., Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1093 (5th Cir. 1973); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D.NJ. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S.
504, 520-31 (1992); see also Rabin, supra note 77, at 124 (arguing that the current wave of
tobacco litigation, brought by government and class action plaintiffs, has been more
successful than prior litigation because it escapes the character-flaw scrutiny that
defendants deploy against individual plaintiffs).
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per thousand.8 ' No substance known to toxic litigation has ever cleared
the causation hurdle with so much room to spare. Thalidomide is the
pinnacle toxin.
As Frances Kelsey has reflected, however, "teratogens less potent
than thalidomide" pose "difficulties of recognition [that are] infinitely
greater."8 2 Although teratogens as potent as thalidomide speak for them-
selves, weaker toxic effects will often be discernible only from epidemio-
logical study (where a group of people, or "cohort," exposed to the sub-
stance should reveal significant increases in risk beyond a background
rate), and some toxic effects will be too small to be detected in an epide-
miological study, even though they are in fact caused by the substance.
These findings cannot satisfy the burden of proof under a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.83 Courts have relied heavily on the ab-
sence of strong epidemiological findings of teratogenicity: the epidemio-
logical threshold set by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation8 4
and several judges in the Bendectin cases85 precluded plaintiffs from
meeting their burden of proof. As Michael Green and others argue, how-
ever, poisons can escape blame when epidemiological evidence is de-
manded, because of recurrent biases and flaws in epidemiological re-
search and the tendency of aggregation to obscure effects on
individuals.8 6 When courts insist on epidemiological findings and reject
as inadequate or irrelevant other types of evidence on causation (such as
animal studies or in vitro research) they carry forward a memory of one
toxin that could meet such high standards, to the detriment of persons
injured by other substances.
Another scholar of causation in mass exposure cases, Troyen
Brennan, identifies a different hierarchy. Professor Brennan argues that
"corpuscularian" evidence, or reasoning based on Newtonian mechanistic
81. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 643, 653 (1992) [hereinafter Green, Expert Witnesses].
82. Green, supra note 13, at 72 (quoting Frances Kelsey). A teratogen, literally
"monster-maker," is a substance that causes birth defects. See Dowie, supra note 16, at 66.
83. See Green, supra note 13, at 305-06, 316-17; Green, Expert Witnesses, supra note
81, at 653.
84. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (ED.N.Y.
1985), aFd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
85. See Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th
Cir. 1989); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.D.C. 1986),
aff'd, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
86. See Green, supra note 13, at 319-20; Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and
Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73
Cornell L. Rev. 469, 498 n.155 (1988); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass
Exposure Litigation, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1995); Green, Expert Witnesses, supra note 81,
at 653. For a contrary view, defending the epidemiological threshold, see Gerald W.
Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific Proof and
the Regulatory Experience, 18 Colum.J. Envtl. L. 181 (1993).
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models of particles moving in response to earlier movements, has been
unduly privileged to rank above "probabilistic" evidence, such as that of
epidemiological studies.87 Only a few toxins can meet this high standard
of causation: "Unfortunately, toxic substance injury cases cannot pro-
duce mechanistic, deductively-derived causal evidence, and a corpuscu-
larian judge cannot process the available probabilistic evidence."88
A third type of hierarchy in the law of toxic causation ranks single,
unitary causes ahead of contingencies and conditions that are part of a
causal constellation. Kenneth Rothman, a leading epidemiologist whose
work played a part in the Bendectin litigation,8 9 has written that "[m] ost
causes that are of interest in the health field are components of sufficient
causes, but are not sufficient in themselves."90 Thalidomide, a sufficient
causal antecedent by itself, easily fulfills the high standard; whereas other
toxins would require a modified standard of cause-in-fact in order to sup-
port a finding of liability in tort.91
Read against this backdrop of scholarly writing, case law emerges as
strongly influenced by hierarchies of causation. In judicial opinions, sub-
stances that could be deemed toxic based on a record of scientific evi-
dence are often exonerated. Courts tell plaintiffs, in effect, good evi-
dence (that is, epidemiological for Green, "corpuscularian" for Brennan,
and unitary and exclusive for Rothman) will deem true toxins to be toxic,
but all that you, plaintiffs, have is low-grade causation evidence (for exam-
ple, animal or in vitro studies in the Green hierarchy, probabilistic or
statistical findings for Brennan, and "components" of constellations in
Rothman's phrase) and accordingly you may not recover.92 That these
hierarchies are inconsistent with one another-statistical evidence, for
87. "A corpuscularian judge would not want to deal with probabilistic notions, as he
would regard these as inferior methods of reasoning." Brennan, supra note 86, at 490-91.
88. Id. at 491.
89. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1354 n.1 (6th Cir. 1992);
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 945-48 (3d Cir. 1990); McBride v.
Merrell Dow & Pharms. Inc., 717 F.2d 1460, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
90. KennethJ. Rothman, Causes, 104 Am.J. Epidemiology 587, 588 (1976); see also
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735, 1789 (1985) (referring to
a "set of antecedent conditions . . . . [that] is sufficient for the occurrence of the
consequence").
91. For a proposal along these lines see Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility,
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the
Concepts, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1001, 1067-77 (1988).
92. See Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1360 (rejecting animal studies because they raise only a
possibility rather than a probability of harm in humans); Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 830
F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting animal-studies evidence in the absence of
confirmatory epidemiological evidence); Hupp v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 25, 30 (S.D.
Ohio 1982) (holding that only epidemiological evidence could prove that a swine flu shot
caused multiple sclerosis). But see Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that "[a] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established
by animal or epidemiological studies"); Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 266
(N.D. Ga. 1985) (stating that plaintiff's burden was not to "produce an unassailable
scientific study" on causation), aff'd and modified in part, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
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example, is high enough in the Green scheme but too low in the
Brennari scheme-suggests that courts set up causation hurdles not in
fidelity to one ideal but rather to assuage their concerns about the ex-
panse and diffusion of mass-exposure litigation.93 Thalidomide makes a
useful contrast. As a matter of tort history it existed; its harms formed a
basis of worldwide litigation; it can pass every feasible test for toxic causa-
tion including the difficult corpuscularian standard, if that standard can
be interpreted to accommodate some peripheral ignorance about the
mechanics of thalidomide on an embryo during organogenesis. 94 With
thalidomide as a contrast, judges assure themselves that their high stan-
dards on causation are not too high for the real world.95
III. CuRRENT LESSONS FROM AN OLD CATASTROPHE
A. The Poor Fit Between Liability and Mass Exposure
As countless writers have noted, procedural elements of civil litiga-
tion such as the plaintiff's traditional burden of proof,96 the preponder-
93. The approach to toxic-substance causation of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, for instance, appears to favor results over principle. Compare Richardson v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting plaintiftfs claim
because of the absence of epidemiological evidence) with Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535
(holding that neither animal nor epidemiological evidence is necessary to establish cause
and effect). For an argument that courts fear opening the floodgates in toxic substance
litigation, see Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary Drawing and the Need for Context-
Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 Va.
Envtl. LJ. 1, 4 (1996) (suggesting that judges following Daubert are excluding too much
evidence); for a partial defense of this concern see Boston, supra note 86, at 187-91
(contrasting diffusion of mass-exposure cases with particularity of traditional torts and
arguing that the former requires strict thresholds of causation).
94. Other criteria for causation that thalidomide would pass include case reports and
disease clusters, see Jeffry D. Cutler, Implications of Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence:
Does Daubert Deal a Death Blow to Toxic Tort Plaintiffs?, 10 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 189, 204
(1995), as well as specific variations on the epidemiological standard that courts have
discussed, see, e.g., DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 958-59 ("A relative risk greater than '2' means that
the disease more likely than not was caused by the event."); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 856-57 (3d Cir. 1990) ("meta-analysis" of prior studies). Because
thalidomide does not produce birth defects in many animals, however, it cannot be
identified as a teratogen by animal studies on certain species, such as rats and mice. See
Sanders, supra note 62, at 314 n.57.
95. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.D.C.
1986) ("[t]he ominous hypothesis of two decades ago, namely, that Bendectin might be
another Thalidomide, has been reduced to the status of a perdurable superstition"), aff'd,
857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100,
1108 (D.D.C. 1986) (quoting an expert's statement that "Bendectin is not an obligatory
teratogen as Thalid[omide] (for example)" (alteration in original)); see also United States
v. 38 Cases, More or Less, 35 F.R.D. 357, 359 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (describing product as not
"dangerous like thalidomide").
96. See Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass
Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 Duke L.J. 848, 879 (proposing burden-shifting
scheme for toxic torts); Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact
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ance of the evidence standard,97 statutes of limitation,98 class action pre-
requisites, 99 jurisdictional requirements, 10 0 discovery procedures,' 0 '
choice-of-law rules, 10 2 and settlement practices 0 3 have functioned poorly
in American mass tort cases. One scholar devotes 549 pages of her
casebook to a part called "Mass Tort Litigation and the Failure of the
Procedural System." 0 4 Notwithstanding the familiar bias in favor of at-
tacks and critiques in legal scholarship, this consensus about failure is
striking.' 0 5
Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 881, 886-87 (1982) (recommending
shifting burden to defendants).
97. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 96, at 892, 900 (recommending recovery in
proportion to probability of causation); Green, Expert Witnesses, supra note 81, at 644
(suggesting that "acceptable evidence of causation" has been confused with "enhanced
judicial scrutiny of expert testimony"); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts:
Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 Yale LJ. 376,
380-82 (1986) (discussing confusion between burden of proof and preponderance
standard); cf. D.H. Kaye, Science in Evidence 30 (1997) (stating that Minnesota excludes
"well-founded, numerically expressed probabilities and population proportions" in its law
of evidence, although this exclusion is equivocal).
98. See 2 ALI, Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury
362-64 (1991); Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic
Substances Litigation, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 965, 968 (1988); Note, The Fairness and
Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1683, 1684
(1983).
99. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 784-85, 787-92
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (Pratt, J.) (weighing advantages and disadvantages of class action device
before certifying the class), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980);James W. Elrod, Comment,
The Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Toxic Pollution Torts, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 243,
243-49 (1988); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs' Due
Process: The Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 871 (1995).
100. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 198-202 (3d Cir. 1993)
(discussing personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction); Jonathan M. Gutoff,
Comment, AdmiraltyJurisdiction Over Asbestos Torts: Unknotting the Tangled Fibers, 54
U. Chi. L. Rev. 312, 320-32 (1987) (arguing that the federal circuit courts have
misconstrued admiralty jurisdiction as an entr& to federal court); Christopher J. Willis,
Aggregation of Punitive Damages in Diversity Class Actions: Will the Real Amount in
Controversy Please Stand Up?, 30 Loy. LA L. Rev. 775, 795-98 (1997) (discussing
preferred judicial rationale concerning diversity jurisdiction in mass exposure claims).
101. See Mirak v. McGhan Medical Corp., 142 F.R.D. 34, 37 (D. Mass. 1992)
(evaluating confidentiality order after a protest by an activist with a "mission of educating
women"); Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 1, at 76 (detailing burdens of
discovery); Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 Geo.
LJ. 295, 319 (1996) (discussing how the expense of discovery distorts litigation).
102. Compare Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
547 (1996) (challenging the idea of a uniform federal rule for choice of law in complex
litigation), with Robert A. Sedler & Aaron Twerski, State Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases:
A Response to "A View from the Legislature," 73 Marq. L. Rev. 625 (1990) (defending state
choice-of-law rules).
103. See Boston & Madden, supra note 7, at 648-55 (describing settlement strategies
and problems in toxic tort litigation).
104. Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation: Cases and Materials 103-651 (1996).
105. The law review bias in favor of attacks allows for defenses of the status quo. See,
e.g., Boston, supra note 86, at 211-74, 351-81 (defending traditional approaches to toxic
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Although some British writers have supposed that American legal
procedures might have permitted thalidomide plaintiffs to flourish in
mass-exposure litigation,10 6 this bit of wishful thinking is misplaced.
Thalidomide litigation in countries similar to the United States produced
settlements that have been labeled, without challenge, "relatively mod-
est,"10 7 "inadequate,"108 and "a pittance." 0 9 Thalidomide claimants ob-
tained next to nothing directly from U.S. courts." 0
The bigger lesson is that mass-tort litigation will provide neither just
compensation nor meaningful deterrence for the benefit of those per-
sons at risk from a toxic substance. Demonstrably inadequate according
to theorylS and experience," 2 tort liability cannot cope with the unan-
swerable questions of fact, temporal changes, multiples sets of conflicting
interests, and onerous default rules (particularly the plaintiff's burden of
proof and condoned delays in the payment of damages) that inevitably
accompany toxic-substance litigation. When ruling against plaintiffs,
American courts have been tempted to believe that these problems would
not have obstructed a hypothetical mass-exposure thalidomide lawsuit." 3
They have used this belief to convince themselves that a strong mass-
exposure case could exist-that civil litigation can cure the ills of mass
exposure-in the teeth of every possible kind of evidence, including the
history of thalidomide.
causation); David Rosenberg, Comment, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases:
Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 695, 729 (1989) (phrasing a defense of the
traditional approach to mass torts as a critique of administrative-compensation alternative
proposals);J.B. Ruhl, Toxic Tort Remedies: The Case Against the "Superduper Fund" and
Other Reform Proposals, 38 Baylor L. Rev. 597, 601-02 (1986) (arguing for retention of
traditional procedures and rules in toxic tort claims). It also permits recommendations of
relatively modest change. In light of these freedoms, the widely held view that civil
litigation procedures fail in toxic tort cases is noteworthy.
106. See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 136; Harvey Teff & Colin R. Munro,
Thalidomide: The Legal Aftermath 138 (1976).
107. Holmes v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 386 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
108. StephenJ. Krause, Punishing the Press: Using Contempt of Court to Secure the
Right to a Fair Trial, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 537, 541 (1996).
109. Carey, supra note 35, at Al; Lynda Hurst, Thalidomide Betrayal, Toronto Star,
Feb. 12, 1989, at S12; see also Leslie Adler, Guinness Rejects More Aid for Thalidomide,
The Reuter Bus. Rep., May 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, WIRES File
(quoting description of settlement demand as "small beer for Guinness").
110. Some American families exposed to thalidomide while Richardson-Merrell was
scattering the drug throughout the United States in ill-supervised clinical trials received
settlements. Of these plaintiffs, some may have received the drug while abroad. One
plaintiff, Shirley McCarrick, brought the only thalidomide action in the world that went to
a verdict: in 1971 a California jury awarded her and her daughter Peggy a then-
astronomical $2.7 million, although Richardson-Merrell ultimately paid them significantly
less. See Drugs in Litigation: Damage Awards Involving Prescription and Nonprescription
Drugs 918 (1992); Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 131-34.
111. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (suggesting that thalidomide is
part of the reason that proof rules on causation are inconsistent and burdensome).
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Attention to evidence, however, also indicates that the drastic rem-
edy of eliminating or preempting tort law for claims of toxic exposure is a
bad idea, at least for the moment. Administrative compensation schemes
are especially vulnerable to many of the charges now levied at tort liabil-
ity: similar problems of causation, transaction costs, and defining what is
compensable would persist in such a plan. 114 Mass torts are a false cure
for toxic exposure not because tort liability is pernicious but because it is
inadequate. Accordingly, tort law should not be "preempted," in Mary
Lyndon's phrase, but rather supplemented by regulation and other policy
initiatives." 5 The thalidomide experience gives focus and particularity to
the effort of balancing difficult choices.
B. Living with Causal Uncertainty in Poliuymaking
In the forum of public debate, as in the courts, assertions about tox-
icity fall short of causation ideals. Yet a brief survey of literature describ-
ing Gulf War syndrome, breast implant accusations, endocrine dis-
ruptors, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia syndrome, and the like
reveals that although skeptics publish trenchant and persuasive argu-
ments they cannot defeat the believers. 116 The confidence of claimants
and their spokespersons is equalled, but not bested, by the confidence of
self-appointed rationalist defenders of truth.
A memory of thalidomide ought to squelch this feeling of certainty
on both sides of the new-syndrome debates over substances alleged to be
toxic. Thalidomide demonstrates that a synthesized toxin can poison
thousands of people, and rationalists must respect the reality of this
point. For their part, new-syndrome claimants must recall all the cer-
tainty that thalidomide offered observers-short limbs and other stark
consequences, strong correlation between exposure and effect, and (sub-
sequent) replications of phocomelia in laboratory animals. Vaguer
claims and a long list of symptoms or manifestations dilute this certainty.
The post-thalidomide approach to toxic exposure requires a change
from all-or-nothing causation standards to graded responses. Some alle-
gations about dangerous conditions and the harms they cause are strong
enough to support the proverbial further study; stronger claims warrant
regulatory action; a different set of claims may justify special compensa-
tion plans; other claims are, have been, and will always be arrant non-
114. See Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 726-30; Ruhl, supra note 105, at 653-56.
115. Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 137, 143 (1995).
116. Prominent skeptical works include Marcia Angell, Science on Trial: The Clash of
Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant Case (1996); Elaine Showalter,
Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modem Culture (1997); Michael Fumento, A
Confederacy of Boobs; Breast Implants, Reason, Oct. 1995, at 36, available in LEXIS,
NEXIS Library, MAGS File; Michael Fumento, Gulf Lore Syndrome. (Myths About
Illnesses Suffered by Gulf War Veterans), Reason, Mar. 1, 1997, at 22, available at 1997 WL
9426590. One environmentalist urges skepticism about skepticism. See David Helvarg,
Poison Pens, Sierra, Jan.-Feb., 1997, at 31.
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sense.117 All these gradations occupy lower places than traditional posi-
tivist standards of causation that scientists often favor,118 and will also
frequently fail the preponderance-of-the-evidence rules of civil liability.
But they do not all deserve equal measures of the same skeptical
dismissal.
Unvarying skepticism about toxic risks is an irresponsible stance.
"Innocent until proven guilty," writes journalist Mark Hertsgaard, "may
sound fine in theory, but it lets the bodies pile up before the truth gets
written." 1 9 Conventions of scientific knowledge, research design, and
business practice limit the accretion of evidence about toxicity.120 For
example, most studies about exposure hazards look at one substance
rather than combinations; 121 low doses and slow exposure are seldom in-
vestigated, in part because of methodological difficulty;' 22 and the risk of
cancer has tended to be overemphasized at the expense of studying other
health effects.' 23 Add to these biases the staggering quantity of possible
sources of harm-in 1989 the United States made and imported 5.9 tril-
lion pounds of industrial chemicals, excluding pesticides, pharmaceuti-
cals and food additives,124 to say nothing of natural poisons and alleged
toxins, such as Gulf War exposure, that implicate sources beyond the
list-and the conclusion of "proven guilty" becomes even more impossi-
ble. Environmental scholars have struggled mightily with such questions
117. For analogies from the regulation literature, see Ian Ayres &John Braithwaite,
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 35 (1992) (describing
"pyramid" of regulatory options, ranging from "persuasion" at the bottom to "license
revocation" at the apex); Dale Gieringer, The FDA's Bad Medicine: Overregulation is
Dangerous to Your Health, Heritage Found. Pol'y Rev., Summer 1985, available in LEXIS,
NEXIS Libary, POLICYFile (outlining drug regulations in the range between approval and
no approval).
118. See Angell, supra note 116, at 108-10 (describing traditions of scientific
knowledge); see also Feldman, supra note 86, at 42 (noting tendency of scientists to favor
delay rather than closure in the face of uncertainty).
119. Mark Hertsgaard, Benefit of the Doubts, Nation, July 8, 1996, at 10.
120. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic
Products, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 773, 784-90 (1997).
121. See Theo Colbom et al., Our Stolen Future: Are We Threatening Our Fertility,
Intelligence, and Survival?-A Scientific Detective Story 220 (1996); see also Mark
Hertsgaard, A World Awash in Chemicals, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Apr. 7, 1996, at 25
(reviewing Colborn et al., supra).
122. See Maurice Zeeman, Our Fate Is Connected with the Animals, 46 BioScience
542, 544 (1996) (reviewing Colborn et al., supra note 121); Joel A. Tickner, Draft
Dissertation Proposal 1-2 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation proposal, University of
Massachusetts, Lowell, Work Environment Program) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
123. See Colbom et al., supra note 121, at 198-203. Cancer is elevated to a high place
among diseases in the federal Delaney Clause, which bans food additives that cause cancer
in any animal species. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (3) (A) (1994).
124. See Zeeman, supra note 122, at 544.
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of risk assessment and so, rather than belabor the subject of a mature
literature, 125 I would only add a word related to thalidomide.
In 1965 the term vorsorgeprinzip emerged in Germany soon after the
devastation of thalidomide, a time when policymakers surveyed industrial
expansion and the weaknesses of pollution-control legislation.' 26 The
vorsorgeprinzip, or precautionary principle, asserted that society should
seek to avoid harm to the environment by blocking the flow of potentially
harmful activities. 127 Expressly endorsed in the 1992 Rio Declaration and
other international agreements, 128 the precautionary principle is an in-
fluential reminder of past industrial calamity. One critic writes that
"[t]he theory can be traced back to Rachel Carson's Silent Spring,"1 29 but
its public acceptance must owe some credit to the concrete, particular
disaster of thalidomide.
Thalidomide continues to have meaning for policymakers seeking to
live by the cryptic precautionary principle.' 30 It focuses concern: be-
cause regulation is constrained by scarcity, serious and real risks to
human beings ought to be at the center of public health regulation, with
lesser hazards-trivial risks, risks for which there is only weak causal evi-
125. See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation (1993); Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science
and the Law 11 (1993); Risk Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the
Environment (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995); Valuing Health
Risks, Costs, and Benefits for Environmental Decision Making (P. Brett Hammond & Rob
Coppock eds., 1990); Viscusi, supra note 63; Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability Under
Uncertainty- A Deontological Approach, 71 Land Econ. 417 (1995).
126. See Konrad von Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental
Policy, reprinted in Royal Comm. on Envtl. Pollution, Twelfth Report: Best Practical
Environmental Option 57-58 (1988); Alex Milne, The Perils of Green Pessimism, New
Scientist, June 12, 1993, at 34, 35.
127. See Tickner, supra note 122, at 3-4.
128. See David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa? 29 Ga. L. Rev. 599, 634 (1995).
129. Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 851, 851 (1996). Many credit Silent Spring, published in 1962, with crystallizing
modem environmental philosophy and the environmental movement. See Fred P.
Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law. An
Introduction, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 847, 864-65 (1994).
130. The maxim "better safe than sorry" is often inane, even destructive in
application. Regulators have invoked it against new technologies that are safer than old
ones, see Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 292 (1985), and in its name have
ignored fatal hardships-malaria, starvation, contaminated medical supplies-while
fretting over synthetic chemicals that have ameliorated these hardships for millions, see
Louis W. Sullivan, Chemical Villains: A Case Unproved, L.A. Times, Apr. 1, 1996, at B5.
Targeted selectively at chemicals and industry, the precautionary principle has begotten
environmental regulations whose costs in public health outweigh benefits, even though it
could with equal logic be applied against proposed new regulations themselves. See Cross,
supra note 129, at 859-61.
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dence, and dangers to plants and animals-at the periphery.18 '
Thalidomide provoked extensive research about hazardous substances, 3 2
an initiative of staggering value that must persevere in light of evidence
that environmental hazards to human health have been increasing. 13
Thalidomide disrupted settled beliefs about causation of injury; today's
policymakers and researchers ought to permit their own beliefs-espe-
cially the dread of false-positive errors-to be disrupted as they investi-
gate environmental culprits.
C. Regulation and the Welfare State
Academic critics of mass tort litigation as a source of compensation,
deterrence, corrective justice, or any other goal are often enthusiastic
partisans of strong regulation and social insurance, ideas whose time in
the United States they have deemed unlikely to come.'3 4 Again
thalidomide serves as a pertinent reminder. Though impervious to tort
liability and unsatisfactory as a source of principle about causation, a
thalidomide-style catastrophe-either the historical event or a similar dis-
131. For suggestions on how to allocate scarce resources in making judgments about
human health risks, see Brennan, supra note 86, at 502-09 (discussing tests for
carcinogenicity); Wagner, supra note 120, at 780-82 (describing National Academy of
Sciences recommendations for tests to determine certain chemicals' potential health
risks). Although the thalidomide experience indicates that serious health risks are indeed
central, it frowns on scarcity or "cost-benefit" arguments against burdening manufacturers
and regulators with duties to test. Dangers to plants and animals, for example, warrant
serious attention, even if costs and benefits to human beings cannot yet be quantified. See
Colborn et al., supra note 121, passim (relying heavily on animal evidence to support
broad-scale environmental reform proposals).
132. See Dowie, supra note 16, at 60-62.
133. See Colborn et al., supra note 121, at 179-95 (noting increases in age-adjusted
rates of prostate cancer, ectopic pregnancies, endometriosis, and breast cancer (among
postmenopausal women with estrogen-responsive tumors); authors also suggest that
increases in hyperactivity and learning disabilities are related to exposure to endocrine
disruptors); L.F. Seachrist, Estrogen Linked to Adult Asthma Risk, Science News, Oct. 28,
1995, at 279 (noting that women receiving estrogen replacement therapy are 50% more
likely to suffer from asthma).
134. See David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 Cal. L. Rev.
665, 675 (1985) (calling widespread social insurance "a long way off"); Robert L. Rabin,
Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52
Md. L. Rev. 951, 975 (1993) (suggesting that hostility to "welfare" makes social insurance a
remote prospect);Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass
Tort Law, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269, 324 (stating that authors favor government action rather
than tort as a source of medical insurance and compensation, but "as realists, we deal with
the system we have"). Not all admirers of regulation and social insurance are liberal
Democrats. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its
Consequences 18 (1988) (endorsing a combination of regulation and insurance in place of
liability); Richard A. Posner, The Path Away From the Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1039, 1041
(1997) (suggesting that if the law heeded the teachings of social science, tort would be
replaced by social insurance); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability:
Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety,
6 YaleJ. on Reg. 65, 66 (1989) (recommending increased regulation and insurance).
2174 [Vol. 97:2153
FORMED BY THAlIDOMIDE
aster in the future-can be handled by the welfare state and its regulation
of hazardous substances. Industrial calamities of the future will be
neither prevented nor remedied by tort law; the thalidomide experience
tells us that public monies must be spent.
Scholars have made valuable contributions to the welfare-state cause,
complementing the law-review attacks on mass torts13 5 with writings that
defend state regulation of health risks13 6 and explain how the fragmen-
tary American safety net might be extended to provide social insur-
ance. 13 7 These ideas cannot be dismissed as idle, gauzy theorizing dis-
connected from the real world; the real world has progressed. The
second Clinton administration has taken a firm proregulatory stand, for
example, and efforts by state attorneys general against cigarette manufac-
turers depict tobacco exposure as "compensable" (via Medicaid recoup-
ment) as well as "tortious."'3 8
In a welfare state persons injured by thalidomide would be compen-
sated; so too would persons with birth defects whose mothers took
Bendectin during pregnancy and who have, in the main, been turned
away from American courts.' 3 9 Perhaps the regulatory powers of the wel-
fare state will forestall the next thalidomide. 140 If they fail, social insur-
ance would remain. This new society might even be attainable-who
knows? Thalidomide is, among other things, a lesson in possibilities, a
warning to expect the unexpected-and it would behoove persons who
understand the effects of a disability whether through personal experi-
135. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
136. See Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective
on Tort Reform, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 1129, 1134-35 (1994); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tort Law in
the Regulatory State, in Tort Law and the Public Interest: Competition, Innovation, and
Consumer Welfare 80, 82 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
137. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law: New
Compensation Mechanisms for Victims, Consumers, and Business 127-48 (1989)
(proposing extensions of current mechanisms); Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman,
Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of
Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 109-16 (1993) (detailing three
models of social insurance, all derived from existing practices); id. at 117 (calling national
health insurance "the necessary first step").
138. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the
Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 63, 70 (1997)
(noting a more promising outlook for current tobacco-related litigation); Michael K.
Mahoney, Coughing Up the Cash: Should Medicaid Provide for Independent State
Recovery Against Third-Party Tortfeasors Such as the Tobacco Industry?, 24 B.C. Envtl. Aff.
L. Rev. 233, 268-69 (1996) (arguing that the case for allowing Medicaid recoupment is
strengthened by reference to insurance needs rather than to the "evil" of tobacco). But
see David R_ Henderson, Joe Camel: Brought to You by the FTC: Do Washington
Regulators Cause Cancer?, Fortune, July 21, 1997, at 31, 32 (criticizing efforts of Clinton
administration to increase regulation of tobacco).
139. See Feldman, supra note 86, at 4; supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
140. John Goldberg argues persuasively, followingJudge Weinstein, that they will not.
See John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on
Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2034, 2037-38 (1997).
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ence, caregiving, advocacy, research, or the practice of law to lend their
firsthand knowledge to the cause of building regulation and social
insurance. 141
CONCLUSION
To bury or praise thalidomide? News stories describe a substance
that can wreak its destruction in a beneficial way, fighting malignant
growths, unwanted new blood vessels, painful symptoms, and a host of
diseases.' 42 In this Essay, thalidomide has served as a contrary metaphor,
invoking malformation and error rooted in iterations of the past. I have
argued in particular that thalidomide not only left American plaintiffs
uncompensated but put future mass-tort plaintiffs in a worse position,
having set up perilous ideals of individualism, self-congratulation, and un-
attainable certainty about causation.
Yet I have also confessed my hope that thalidomide might be put to
beneficial use in law and policy, just as it continues to serve humanity in
medicine and public health. Like other countries, the United States has
a thalidomide heritage, and that heritage ought to limit, not bolster, the
American faith in mass torts. Mass-tort liability has done much good in
the United States, but not enough. A wealthy nation has the money-as
well as the pressing challenges created by threats to public health-to
invest much more, through regulation and social welfare spending, in its
own prosperity.
141. Randy Warren of Canada and Freddie Astbury of Britain are two thalidomide-
afflicted activists whose efforts could be extended to argue more generally for the kind of
social insurance available to all citizens of their countries.
142. See Sherman & Strauss, supra note 58, at 468; Ready, supra note 5, at Al;
Stolberg, supra note 5.
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